Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing? by Gugliuzza, Paul & Lemley, Mark A.
Boston University School of Law
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
4-2018
Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?
Paul Gugliuzza
Boston University School of Law
Mark A. Lemley
Stanford Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 Vanderbilt Law Review 765 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/208
Gugliuzza & Lemley_Galley (Do Not Delete) 4/5/2018 10:43 AM 
 
765 
Can a Court Change the Law by 
Saying Nothing?  
Paul R. Gugliuzza*  
Mark A. Lemley** 
Can an appellate court alter substantive law without writing an 
opinion? We attempt to answer that question by conducting a novel 
empirical investigation into how the Federal Circuit has implemented 
the Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling in Alice v. CLS Bank, the most recent 
in a series of Supreme Court decisions strengthening patent law’s 
patentable subject matter requirement. Our dataset includes each one of 
the Federal Circuit’s more than 100 decisions on patentable subject 
matter in the three years since Alice, including affirmances issued 
without an opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36.  
Including those no-opinion affirmances, the Federal Circuit has 
found the patent to be invalid in more than 90% of its decisions. The 
court’s precedential opinions, however, tell a different story: nearly a 
quarter of them favor the patentee by rejecting challenges to patent 
validity. This difference is due largely to one remarkable fact: although 
the court has issued over fifty Rule 36 affirmances finding the asserted 
patent to be invalid, it has not issued a single Rule 36 affirmance when 
finding in favor of a patentee. Rather, it has written an opinion in every 
one of those cases.  
As a result, the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinions provide 
an inaccurate picture of how disputes over patentable subject matter are 
actually resolved. Precedential opinions suggest that any given patent 
has a decent chance of surviving an eligibility challenge at the Federal 
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Circuit. But, in reality, very few patents do. Our findings suggest that, 
by saying nothing, a court can indeed affect substantive law, or at least 
the perception of it. This has interesting implications both for the 
ongoing debate over the legality of Rule 36 and, more broadly, for 
understanding the differences between the law on the books and the 
actual experience of litigants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter decisions 
between 2010 and 2014 upended the law in important ways. In four 
decisions culminating in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,1 the 
Court reinvigorated the long-dormant doctrine, setting forth a new test 
for assessing patentable subject matter that threw out prior Federal 
Circuit precedent and sent the patent bar into a tizzy. 
 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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In this Article, we conduct a novel empirical investigation into 
how the Federal Circuit has implemented Alice in the three years since 
it was decided. Our dataset includes each of the Federal Circuit’s 104 
post-Alice decisions on patentable subject matter, including 
precedential opinions, nonprecedential opinions, and, crucially, 
affirmances without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36.2  
Among our more interesting findings is that the Federal Circuit 
writes precedential opinions much more frequently when it rules in 
favor of the patentee than when it invalidates the patent. Overall, the 
Federal Circuit has found the patent to be valid in only 7.7% of its post-
Alice decisions on patentable subject matter. But nearly three times as 
many (21.2%) of the court’s post-Alice precedential opinions favor the 
patentee by rejecting challenges to patent validity. Remarkably, 
although the court has issued over fifty Rule 36 affirmances finding the 
asserted patent to be invalid, it has not issued a single Rule 36 
affirmance when finding in favor of a patentee. Rather, it has written 
an opinion in every one of those cases.  
The disproportionate number of precedential opinions favoring 
patentees obscures the actual trends in the cases. It also has significant 
implications for substantive patent law and for the process of appellate 
judging. For example, one might interpret the Federal Circuit’s 
preference for precedential opinions when ruling in favor of patentees 
as evidence of the court undermining the Supreme Court’s restrictions 
on patentable subject matter, which would be consistent with long-
standing perceptions of the Federal Circuit as biased in favor of patent 
owners.3 Similarly, the large number of Rule 36 affirmances 
invalidating patents could indicate that the court is “hiding” those 
decisions, lending support to recent arguments that the Federal 
 
 2. Including Rule 36 affirmances is essential to providing an accurate empirical analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s decisionmaking practices. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 234 (2005); David 
L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in 
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 235 (2008); see also John R. Allison et al., Understanding the 
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2014) (noting that many 
empirical studies of patent litigation omit unreported decisions such as Rule 36 affirmances). 
Because Rule 36 affirmances say nothing besides “AFFIRMED,” however, one must review the 
docket and the parties’ briefs for each case to determine the legal issues in dispute, which we have 
done for this Article. Appendix A, infra, provides a full list of the decisions included in our dataset. 
For administrability, we ended our data collection on June 19, 2017, the three-year anniversary of 
Alice. For a more detailed description of our methodology, see infra notes 80, 84.  
 3. See generally Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1628 n.40 (2007) (summarizing conflicting arguments about 
whether the Federal Circuit has, in fact, been “pro-patent”). 
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Circuit’s use of Rule 36 is unwise as a policy matter, inconsistent with 
the requirements of the Patent Act, or even unconstitutional.4  
We think, however, that there are two other more likely 
explanations for the disproportionate number of precedential opinions 
upholding validity against challenges to patentable subject matter. The 
first relates to the fact that, as high as the invalidity rate is in the 
Federal Circuit (92.3%), the invalidity rate in the district court and 
Patent Office proceedings that have so far been reviewed by the Federal 
Circuit is even higher: 96.2%. Thus, the Federal Circuit has had very 
few opportunities to even consider affirming a ruling of validity via Rule 
36. And appeals from rulings of invalidity are now such a common 
occurrence in the Federal Circuit that many of those cases may be the 
types of “easy” cases for which Rule 36 was designed. But there are 
many more district court decisions upholding validity than have been 
appealed to the Federal Circuit so far.5 Once the Federal Circuit begins 
reviewing more decisions upholding validity, the court’s high rate of 
finding invalidity could decrease.  
A second reason for the disproportionate number of precedential 
opinions upholding validity is that the judges of the Federal Circuit are 
simply responding to the demands of their audience, as one might 
expect from a semi-specialized court.6 After four Supreme Court 
decisions in four years ruling against the patentee on patentable subject 
matter,7 and another six months of post-Alice Federal Circuit decisions 
 
 4. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Wrongly Affirmed Without Opinion, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
561, 562–63 (2017); Gene Quinn & Peter Harter, Does the Federal Circuit’s Use of Rule 36 Call into 
Question Integrity of the Judicial Process?, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/14/federal-circuit-rule-36-integrity-judicial-process/id=78261 
[https://perma.cc/FEU6-7FCM]; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24–29, Leak Surveys, 
Inc. v. FLIR Sys., Inc., No. 17-194 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2017) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s use of 
Rule 36 is unlawful in appeals from the Patent Office), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 325 (2017) (mem.); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17–20, Celgard, LLC v. Matal, No. 16-1526 (U.S. filed June 19, 
2017) (same); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6–7, Petter Invs. v. Hydro Eng’g, No. 17-1055 
(U.S. filed Jan. 18, 2018) (arguing that Rule 36 affirmances in appeals from district court litigation 
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 2018 WL 575049 (U.S. Apr. 2, 
2018) (mem.). But see Matthew J. Dowd, An Examination of the Federal Circuit’s Use of Rule 36 
Affirmances (Feb. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920306 
[https://perma.cc/LU8H-BARN] (defending the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36). For an 
explanation of the argument that Rule 36 violates the Patent Act, see infra Section III.B.  
 5. See infra Section III.A. 
 6. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 99 (2006). 
 7. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
566 U.S. 66 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
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invalidating patents,8 patent applicants, litigants, district judges, and 
the Patent Office needed examples of inventions that remained patent 
eligible. The Federal Circuit has delivered by writing a precedential 
opinion nearly every time it has concluded that a patent is valid. But as 
a consequence, the court’s precedential opinions provide an inaccurate 
picture of how disputes over patentable subject matter are actually 
resolved.  
In this Article, we take a step toward correcting any 
misconceptions about the law of patentable subject matter by providing 
empirical evidence on how the Federal Circuit has dealt with Alice on 
appeal, including through the often-overlooked mechanism of Rule 36 
affirmances without opinion.9 In Part I, we discuss the doctrine of 
patentable subject matter and the controversial changes Alice and its 
progeny have wrought. In Part II, we present our empirical evaluation 
of every Federal Circuit decision on patentable subject matter since 
Alice. Finally, in Part III, we discuss the implications of our findings for 
both the substantive law of patentable subject matter and the role of 
Rule 36 in shaping the contours of legal doctrine. Whether in patent law 
or in other fields, understanding the operation of law in practice 
requires looking beyond written opinions to see what the courts are 
saying when they say nothing. 
I. THE RESURRECTION OF THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
REQUIREMENT 
To provide context for our empirical analysis, we first offer an 
introduction to the patentable subject matter requirement and the 
controversy surrounding current doctrine. 
A. Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court 
Section 101 of the Patent Act permits patents on any new and 
useful “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”10 
 
 8. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 9. As one Federal Circuit judge and a co-author recently noted, “Although Rule 36 
affirmances without opinion are not frequently a focus of the academic literature, they account for 
a significant number of Federal Circuit dispositions.” Evan J. Wallach & Jonathan J. Darrow, 
Federal Circuit Review of USPTO Inter Partes Review Decisions, by the Numbers: How the AIA 
Has Impacted the Caseload of the Federal Circuit, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 105, 113 
(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Figure 1 (reporting that Rule 36 
affirmances account for 42.3% of Federal Circuit decisions in appeals from district courts and the 
Patent and Trademark Office). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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Despite that broad language, courts have long held that § 101 contains 
an “implicit exception” that prohibits patenting laws of nature, natural 
phenomena (sometimes, “product[s] of nature”11), and abstract ideas.12 
The story of how the courts have developed and applied that exception 
is long and complicated.13 For the purpose of this Article, we can pick 
up the thread in the 1980s, when the Supreme Court turned away from 
prior case law limiting the patent eligibility of relatively primitive 
innovations in biotechnology14 and computer software.15 Early in that 
decade, the Court upheld the patent eligibility of a self-replicating, 
genetically modified bacterium,16 and also confirmed the eligibility of a 
computer-driven process for molding rubber.17 Ushering in a new era, 
the Court selectively quoted from the legislative history of the 1952 
Patent Act to claim that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to 
‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’ ”18  
 
 11. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 580. 
 12. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 13. For thorough analyses of the evolution of the patentable subject matter requirement, see, 
for example, 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 277–314 (2017); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: 
REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 3–16 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/101-Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3ML-5PRY]; Margo A. 
Bagley, Patent Barbarians at the Gate: The Who, What, When, Where, Why and How of U.S. Patent 
Subject Matter Eligibility Disputes, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 149, 151–55 (Ruth L. 
Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014); Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2001); Kevin Emerson Collins, 
Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 345–60 (2007); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of 
Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism 
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1289, 1292–305 (2011); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection 
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032–98 
(1990); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 63–84 (2011); Peter S. Menell & Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Rethinking Patent Eligibility 
for the Modern Scientific Age 7–10 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2402776, 2014; 
U.C. Hastings, Research Paper No. 97, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402776 
[https://perma.cc/9Q5M-26NJ].  
 14. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (invalidating a patent 
on a composition of two naturally occurring bacteria). 
 15. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that a process that used a 
mathematical formula for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion was not patent 
eligible); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding ineligible for patenting a 
computer program that used a mathematical formula to convert binary-coded decimal numerals 
into pure binary numbers). 
 16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
 17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
 18. Id. at 182 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)); accord 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. The full sentence in the committee reports suggests a different 
understanding: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include 
anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 
101 unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.” S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 
6; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 641–42 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(criticizing the truncated presentation of the legislative history). 
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In the wake of those Supreme Court decisions, the Federal 
Circuit further loosened restrictions on patent eligibility, rendering the 
patentable subject matter requirement effectively a dead letter.19 In the 
1990s and early 2000s, the Patent Office regularly issued—and the 
Federal Circuit regularly upheld the validity of—patents on computer 
software,20 business methods,21 and isolated DNA sequences.22 After 
the bursting of the internet stock bubble in 2001, however, many 
software and business method patents ended up in the hands of patent 
assertion entities (“PAEs,” or, more controversially, “patent trolls”).23 
Around the same time, concerns began to emerge that DNA patents 
were creating an anticommons inhibiting the emergence of useful gene 
therapies.24 Also, because patents covering genetic information are 
nearly impossible to invent around, those patents sometimes appeared 
to be impairing clinical practice, hindering the development of 
diagnostics and therapeutics, and, ultimately, harming patients.25 
These considerations, among others, led to widespread calls for 
tightening the standards of patentability.26  
In 2006, the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the patentable 
subject matter requirement in a case it ultimately dismissed as 
improvidently granted.27 A year later (and perhaps following the 
Supreme Court’s signal28), the Federal Circuit cautiously added some 
teeth to the patentable subject matter requirement in two decisions 
issued on the same day. In one decision, the court upheld the Patent 
 
 19. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011). 
 20. E.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 21. E.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 22. See generally Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: 
A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 
358–60 (2002) (discussing the relevant case law and the Patent Office’s patent-granting practices). 
 23. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 737–38 
(2015). 
 24. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT 87–89 (2009). 
 25. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, 
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1370 (2011) 
(discussing problems of preemption and overbreadth in biotechnology patents). 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14–15 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/ 
innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTR8-P57R]; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) 
(arguing for a more rigorous patentable subject matter requirement, noting an “important ongoing 
debate” about “whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately 
reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y]’ ” (alterations in original)). 
 27. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125. 
 28. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Essay, The Federal Circuit’s Acquiescence(?), 66 AM. U. L. REV. 
1061, 1076 (2017). 
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Office’s rejection of an application claiming electromagnetic signals 
designed to prevent unauthorized copying of digital content, reasoning 
that a transitory signal does not fall within the four categories of 
patentable subject matter listed in § 101 (“process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter”).29 In the other decision, the 
Federal Circuit held that a method of requiring and conducting 
arbitration was not patentable subject matter, emphasizing that, 
although some business methods are patent eligible, the application at 
issue impermissibly claimed the “mental processes” used to resolve a 
legal dispute.30  
The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in patentable subject 
matter began in 2010 with Bilski v. Kappos.31 In that case, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a patent on a method of hedging financial risk, 
holding that it claimed an “abstract idea” and was therefore not 
patentable subject matter.32  
Two years later, the Supreme Court considered another 
patentable subject matter dispute, Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., which involved diagnostic tests used to 
help doctors determine whether the dosage of a particular drug was too 
low or too high.33 The patent-in-suit claimed a method of administering 
the drug to a patient, measuring its metabolite levels in the body, and 
comparing those levels to ranges disclosed in the patent to determine 
whether dosage should be increased or decreased.34 In holding that the 
patent did not satisfy the patentable subject matter requirement, the 
Court first ruled that the correlation between metabolite levels and 
drug safety and efficacy recited in the patent was a “law of nature,”35 
or, perhaps more precisely, a fact about the world. Putting aside that 
unpatentable correlation, the Court then concluded that the patent 
contained no other “inventive concept,” which the Court held was 
essential to satisfying the patentable subject matter requirement.36 
Rather, in telling doctors to administer the drug and determine its 
 
 29. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 30. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)). The Federal Circuit later revised and vacated 
its original opinion but reached the same result. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 31. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 609. In the decision below, the en banc Federal Circuit had also invalidated the 
patent, building on its prior rulings in Nuijten and Comiskey strengthening the patentable subject 
matter requirement. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 33. 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
 34. Id. at 74–75. 
 35. Id. at 77. 
 36. Id. at 72–73. 
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metabolite levels, the patent simply recited “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity” that doctors already engaged in.37 In other words, 
the patent did not comply with the eligibility requirement because it 
merely instructed doctors to apply established techniques to a newly 
discovered fact about the world.  
After a 2013 decision holding that isolated DNA segments are 
not patentable subject matter because they are “product[s] of nature,”38 
the Court in 2014 decided its most recent patentable subject matter 
case, Alice.39 Alice involved patents related to a computer program that 
used an intermediary to mitigate the risk that only one party to a 
financial transaction would perform its obligation.40 In its opinion 
invalidating the patents, the Court drew on Mayo to articulate a two-
step test that serves as the foundation for eligibility analysis under 
current law, regardless of whether the basis for challenge is that the 
patent claims a law of nature, product of nature, natural phenomenon, 
or abstract idea. According to the Court, the first step is to determine 
whether the patent claim is directed to one of those “patent-ineligible 
concepts.”41 If so, the next question is whether there are “additional 
elements” that “transform” the claim into a patent-eligible application 
of the underlying concept.42 The Court in Alice explained that this 
second step of the analysis is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., 
an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that 
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon 
the [ineligible concept] itself.’ ”43  
Applying that test to the facts of the case, the Court first 
determined that using intermediaries to mitigate risk was an abstract 
idea, in part because, like risk hedging in Bilski, “intermediated 
settlement is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our 
system of commerce.”44 On the second step, the Court concluded that 
merely performing that abstract idea on a general-purpose computer, 
 
 37. Id. at 79–80. 
 38. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 595 (2013). In the 
same decision, the Court upheld patents on synthetically created DNA because it does not occur 
in nature. Id. at 594–95. That is the only time the Supreme Court has found an invention to satisfy 
the patentable subject matter requirement in its recent string of cases. 
 39. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 40. Id. at 2351–52. 
 41. Id. at 2355. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 
(2012)). 
 44. Id. at 2356 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 
611 (2010)).  
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as the patent claimed, did not represent the “inventive concept” 
required for patent eligibility.45  
B. Alice in the Federal Circuit: The Doctrine 
Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has issued 104 decisions on 
patentable subject matter.46 As explained in detail below, the vast 
majority of those decisions find the claimed invention not to be patent 
eligible. But, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s recent case law, the 
Federal Circuit has upheld a few patents against eligibility challenges, 
almost invariably in precedential opinions. The Federal Circuit’s post-
Alice patentable subject matter decisions cluster in two technological 
areas: information technology (“IT”) and biotechnology. 
IT-related inventions the Federal Circuit has found eligible 
include a patent addressing the problem of retaining website visitors 
upon the click of an advertising link,47 a patent on a “self-referential 
table for a computer database,”48 a patent on filtering internet 
content,49 and a patent on a computerized process for synchronizing 
animation with sound.50 Some observers have synthesized the Supreme 
Court’s and the Federal Circuit’s case law into a “technological arts” 
test, concluding that “advances in non-technological disciplines—such 
as business, law, or the social sciences” are not patent eligible merely 
because they employ computer technology, as illustrated by Alice and 
Bilski.51 On the other hand, patents covering technological 
improvements in computer hardware or software itself are patent 
 
 45. Id. at 2357–58 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 46. For the methodology we used to arrive at this number, see infra note 84. 
 47. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 48. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 49. Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
 50. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 51. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(“A rule holding that claims are impermissibly abstract if they are directed to an entrepreneurial 
objective, such as methods for increasing revenue, minimizing economic risk, or structuring 
commercial transactions, rather than a technological one, would comport with the guidance 
provided in both Alice and Bilski.”); Joshua L. Sohn, A Defense of the Current Jurisprudence on 
Section 101, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/846930/a-defense-of-the-
current-jurisprudence-on-section-101 [https://perma.cc/VL78-SM22] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has 
consistently invalidated patent claims that simply apply economic, business, or human-interaction 
practices on a computer without improving the computer itself or any other technological art.”). 
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eligible, as illustrated by Federal Circuit decisions upholding 
eligibility52 and as suggested by the Supreme Court in Alice.53  
Notably, to satisfy the patentable subject matter requirement, 
the patent must be directed to the specific technological improvements 
themselves;54 broad, functional claiming of the idea of solving a problem 
in computer technology remains impermissibly abstract.55 Thus, 
several Federal Circuit cases that uphold eligibility do so only after 
narrowing the claims by reading in limits from the specification or a 
claim construction ruling—including claim construction rulings made 
by the Federal Circuit itself on appeal.56 
In the realm of biotechnology, inventions are more likely to 
survive eligibility challenges if the patent covers the making of a new 
thing, as opposed to the isolation or detection of a naturally occurring 
chemical. In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., for example, the 
 
 52. See Matt Levy, Software Patents Will Survive: How Section 101 Law is Settling Down, 
IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/11/30/software-patents-will-
survive/id=75101 [https://perma.cc/2F9R-J5LF] (noting that a claim is patent eligible under recent 
Federal Circuit case law if it is “a technical improvement to a technical problem”). 
 53. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (noting that the patents in suit 
“[did] not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself”). 
 54. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The inquiry 
often is whether the claims are directed to ‘a specific means or method’ for improving technology 
or whether they are simply directed to an abstract end-result.” (quoting McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314)). 
 55. See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
first step in the Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted 
improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract 
idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.”). For a discussion of the problem of 
functional claiming in software, see Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of 
Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919–36.  
 56. See, e.g., McRO, 837 F.3d at 1311, 1313 (construing claims in the manner suggested by 
the patentee and drawing on narrowing statements from the specification to uphold eligibility); 
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The collection, 
filtering, aggregating, and completing steps all depend upon the invention’s unique distributed 
architecture . . . . An understanding of how this is accomplished is only possible through an 
examination of the claims in light of the written description.”); id. at 1306 (“While the components 
and functionality necessarily involved in the . . . patent . . . may be generic at first blush, an 
examination of the claim in light of the written description reveals that many of these components 
and functionalities are in fact neither generic nor conventional individually or in ordered 
combination. Instead, they describe a specific, unconventional technological solution, narrowly 
drawn to withstand preemption concerns, to a technological problem.”); cf. Affinity Labs of Tex., 
LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Even if all the details contained in 
the specification were imported into the . . . claims, the result would still not be a concrete 
implementation of the abstract idea.”); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 
1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Turning to the second step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry, we conclude 
that there is nothing in the claims or the specification . . . that constitutes a concrete 
implementation of the abstract idea in the form of an ‘inventive concept.’ ”). In one recent case, the 
majority’s reliance on the specification to narrow the claims and save them from invalidation 
prompted a vigorous dissent from Judge Reyna, who asserted that the practice of looking to the 
specification “contravenes the fundamental [principle] that the section 101 inquiry is about 
whether the claims are directed to a patent-eligible invention, not whether the specification is so 
directed.” Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1307 (Reyna, J., dissenting).  
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court invalidated a patent on methods of detecting fetal DNA that floats 
freely in the mother’s body.57 Though the discovery of fetal DNA in the 
mother’s bloodstream enabled safer and cheaper genetic testing,58 fetal 
DNA appears naturally in the mother’s blood and the techniques used 
to detect and amplify it were well known.59 By contrast, in Rapid 
Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
upheld the eligibility of a patent on a method of preserving hepatocytes, 
a type of liver cell.60 Even though the patent turned on the discovery 
that hepatocytes could survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles—a natural 
trait of the cells—the patent claimed an actual, physical method of 
preservation (not merely observation) that was new.61 Consequently, 
according to the court, the patent was directed to more than an 
ineligible natural phenomenon, and it contained the inventive concept 
required by Mayo and Alice.62  
C. The Controversy over Patentable Subject Matter 
The current state of patentable subject matter doctrine has 
elicited vociferous complaints from lawyers, scholars, and even some 
judges. They criticize Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law as 
confusing and unpredictable.63 They worry that the restriction of patent 
eligibility threatens innovation, particularly in the fields of 
biotechnology and medical diagnostics.64 And they lament that the 
patentable subject matter requirement serves no policy objective not 
already addressed by the portions of the Patent Act specifically 
requiring the claimed invention to be nonobvious (that is, “inventive”) 
 
 57. 788 F.3d 1371, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 58. Rachel Rebouché, Testing Sex, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 527 (2015). 
 59. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376–77 (analogizing to Mayo); accord Cleveland Clinic Found. v. 
True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (applying similar reasoning 
to invalidate patents on methods of testing for the presence of an enzyme associated with 
cardiovascular disease). 
 60. 827 F.3d 1042, 1045, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 61. See id. at 1048 (“[T]he claims are simply not directed to the ability of hepatocytes to 
survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles. Rather, the claims . . . are directed to a new and useful 
laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes.” (emphasis added)). 
 62. Id. at 1050–52. 
 63. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for 
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (2014); 
Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of 
Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2014); Paul R. Michel, The Supreme Court 
Saps Patent Certainty, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1751, 1754 (2014); David O. Taylor, Confusing 
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158–59 (2016). 
 64. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 
286 (2015) (discussing the unclear policy implications of restrictions on patent eligibility in the 
field of medical diagnostics).  
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and adequately disclosed (that is, not too broadly or too abstractly 
described).65 Those concerns have led the major bar associations 
representing patent lawyers to call for legislation overturning the 
Supreme Court’s patentable subject matter case law.66 
The substantive criticisms of current doctrine are, to varying 
degrees, well taken. Aspects of the patentable subject matter inquiry 
indisputably overlap with other patentability requirements.67 Though 
the Federal Circuit’s cases can be synthesized into somewhat coherent 
rules (as we attempted to do above), one can certainly identify 
inconsistencies that make it difficult to predict future outcomes.68 And 
cases such as Ariosa illustrate the risk that the eligibility requirement 
may exclude some socially valuable inventions from patentability.69 
That said, the patentable subject matter requirement does serve an 
important procedural function by providing a mechanism to quickly and 
cheaply knock out patents that are plainly invalid.70 Most key 
 
 65. J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 267, 281 (2015) (summarizing commentary); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin & Peter S. 
Menell, Restoring the Legislative Framework for Patenting Applications of Scientific Discoveries 
23 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2767904, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2767904 [https://perma.cc/M2TY-8HEG] (“By shoehorning an extra requirement for 
inventiveness and a concern over undue preemption into § 101, Mayo contradicts Congress’s 
carefully crafted framework and ignores the legislative mandate to weigh inventiveness and 
preemption concerns under § 103 and § 112, respectively.”). 
 66. See Josh Landau, AIPLA Signs on to IPO’s Misguided Proposal on § 101, PAT. PROGRESS 
(May 17, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/05/17/aipla-signs-ipos-misguided-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/68UF-ZEXN]. 
 67. See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 377 (2015) (discussing the problems of “supplant[ing] 
a traditional novelty and nonobviousness analysis” with the patentable subject matter 
requirement); Lemley et al., supra note 19, at 1329–32 (considering potential overlaps of—and 
distinctions between—patentable subject matter analysis and the disclosure doctrines of § 112). 
But cf. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 722 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., 
concurring) (“Section 101’s vital role—a role that sections 103 and 112 are not equipped to take 
on—is to cure systemic constitutional infirmities by eradicating those patents which stifle 
technological progress and unjustifiably impede the free flow of ideas and information.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats 
Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 701–03 (2016) (defending “the Supreme Court’s move to revive subject-
matter eligibility doctrine and to do so in a way that involves doctrinal overlaps,” but citing critical 
commentary). 
 68. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 39–40), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987289 [https://perma.cc/X98A-KD7B]. But cf. 
Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1117, 1148 (2016) (noting that it is not unusual for common law doctrines, such as patentable 
subject matter, to be uncertain in application in the initial stages of development). 
 69. See Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 39. But cf. Colleen V. Chien & Arti K. Rai, An Empirical 
Analysis of Diagnostic Patenting Post-Mayo 3–4 (Jan. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors) (showing no decline in patenting of diagnostic methods or investment in them since 
the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the eligibility requirement).  
 70. Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 40; cf. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of 
Patentability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 104 (2017) (noting that “[c]ourts’ use of subject-matter 
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requirements of patentability, such as nonobviousness and enablement, 
cannot be resolved until summary judgment at the earliest because they 
turn on disputed questions of fact.71 But patentable subject matter is a 
question of law that can be resolved on the pleadings—before the 
parties incur the time and expense of discovery.72  
Our purpose here is not to resolve the vigorous, ongoing debate 
over the patentable subject matter requirement. Rather, we hope to 
illuminate that debate by presenting empirical evidence about the 
Federal Circuit’s practices in deciding the issue.  
II. THE SILENT JURISPRUDENCE OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
This Part presents the core of our empirical analysis, beginning 
with background statistics on how the Federal Circuit resolves appeals 
generally, then turning to a detailed examination of the court’s post-
Alice decisions on patentable subject matter. 
A. Federal Circuit Decisions Generally 
The Federal Circuit decides an appeal in one of three ways: by 
writing a precedential opinion, by writing a nonprecedential opinion, or 
by affirming without an opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36. 
Precedential opinions make law—they bind future panels of the court 
and can be overturned only by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or by 
the Supreme Court.73 The Federal Circuit issues nonprecedential 
opinions, by contrast, when it thinks the disposition will not 
significantly advance the law.74 According to the Federal Circuit’s 
 
eligibility as a shortcut to other patentability requirements appears to offer significant savings in 
decision cost,” but that “these savings likely come at the expense of higher error costs” because 
courts decide validity before resolving important preliminary issues, such as claim construction). 
 71. Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 40. 
 72. Id. Since Alice the Federal Circuit has regularly held patent claims ineligible on motions 
to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 
1350, 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But see Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 
882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that factual allegations in the complaint about the 
patent’s inventiveness required the district court to deny a motion to dismiss on eligibility 
grounds); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a fact dispute 
about the patent’s inventiveness precluded summary judgment). 
 73. Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 74. See FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 10.3 to 10.4 (noting that the court will 
not publish a precedential opinion if it will not “add significantly to existing law” and listing 
various other criteria for determining whether to publish a precedential opinion). For a more 
general discussion of how the federal courts of appeals decide when to issue nonprecedential 
opinions, see Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the 
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004). For an overview of criticisms of nonprecedential 
opinions—and a defense of their use—by a federal court of appeals judge, see Boyce F. Martin, Jr., 
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Internal Operating Procedures, nonprecedential opinions are designed 
mainly “to tell the losing party why its arguments were not 
persuasive.”75 Lastly, affirmance without opinion is permissible in five 
circumstances outlined in Federal Circuit Rule 36.76 The purpose of the 
rule is to allow quick disposition of “easy” cases,77 such as cases where 
the basis for affirmance is that the factual record adequately supports 
the judgment below.78 A Rule 36 affirmance is issued per curiam by the 
three-judge panel and consists of one word and one citation: 
“AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.”79  
As Figure 1 below illustrates, the relative proportion of 
precedential opinions, nonprecedential opinions, and Rule 36 
affirmances issued by the Federal Circuit has changed noticeably over 
the past few years.80 As recently as 2010, the court decided fewer than 
 
In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 180 (1999). For a foundational critique 
of the then-recent increase in the federal courts of appeals’ use of nonprecedential opinions, see 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-precedential Precedent—Limited 
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 
1205 (1978). And for a debate over whether it is constitutional for the federal courts of appeals to 
decide cases by nonprecedential opinion, compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 
(8th Cir.), vacated as moot on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), which held 
unconstitutional an Eighth Circuit rule stating that unpublished opinions were not precedent, 
with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), which upheld a similar rule in the 
Ninth Circuit against a constitutional challenge. 
 75. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 10.3.  
 76. Rule 36 provides, in full: 
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule, when it 
determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion would have no 
precedential value: 
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on findings 
that are not clearly erroneous; 
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient; 
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the 
pleadings; 
(d)  the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the standard 
of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or  
(e)  a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.  
FED. CIR. R. 36. 
 77. As Chief Judge Markey explained the year the court adopted the rule, it’s for cases “where 
it’s not necessary to explain, even to the loser, why he lost.” Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, 
Remarks at the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (May 24, 1989), in 128 F.R.D. 409, 420 (1989). 
 78. See, e.g., FED. CIR. R. 36(a)–(c). 
 79. E.g., FO2GO LLC v. Pinterest, Inc., 672 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Full disclosure: 
one of us (Lemley) argued that case on appeal for the prevailing party. Even fuller disclosure: the 
other one of us (Gugliuzza) picked the example, partly for that reason. 
 80. We used Jason Rantanen’s database of Federal Circuit decisions to create Figures 1–3, 
as well as Figure 15. For a detailed description of the methodology used to build that database, see 
Jason Rantanen, The Landscape of Modern Patent Appeals, 67 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 10–18), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140527 [https://perma.cc/GG6T-7NKY]. 
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a third of appeals from the district courts and the Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) via Rule 36 affirmances; nearly half of the 
court’s decisions were rendered in precedential opinions. By 2016, 
however, those proportions had almost flipped. The court decided over 
40% of its district court and PTO appeals via Rule 36, and fewer than a 
third of its decisions were precedential opinions.  
 
FIGURE 1: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS FROM 
DISTRICT COURTS AND THE PTO 
 
 
The court’s increased use of Rule 36 is usually attributed to the 
growing number of appeals from the PTO in the wake of the America 
Invents Act,81 which created new opportunities for accused infringers 
to challenge patent validity in streamlined administrative proceedings 
beginning in 2012.82 Indeed, as Figure 2 below illustrates, the number 
of Federal Circuit decisions in appeals from the PTO has increased over 
fourfold, from 46 in 2010 to 202 in 2016, causing an overall increase in 
the Federal Circuit’s PTO and district court docket from 238 decisions 
in 2010 to 449 decisions in 2016.83 Also, the proportion of PTO appeals 
 
 81. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 28, at 1085–86. 
 82. For an overview of those proceedings, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 271, 279–85 (2016). 
 83. Federal Circuit appeals from the PTO and the district courts consist almost entirely of 
patent cases. A small fraction of PTO appeals (roughly 5%) are trademark cases and an even 
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resolved through Rule 36 has increased from 37.0% in 2010 to 50.5% in 
2016.  
 
FIGURE 2: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS FROM 
THE PTO 
 
 
The caseload pressure from the increasing number of PTO 
appeals appears to be having spillover effects on how the court handles 
appeals from the district courts. As Figure 3 shows, in appeals from 
district courts, the percentage of precedential opinions has fallen from 
50.0% in 2010 to 39.7% in 2016, and the percentage of Rule 36 
affirmances has increased from 29.7% in 2010 to 35.6% in 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
smaller fraction of district court appeals involve suits against the United States seeking monetary 
relief. See Appeals Filed, by Category: FY 2016, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR. (2016), 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY16_Caseload_by 
_Category.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z23K-2Z6Y]. Also, patent cases can make it to the Federal Circuit 
from the International Trade Commission and the Court of Federal Claims, but those numbers are 
small, too. See id. Thus, the number of district court and PTO appeals provides a close estimate of 
the Federal Circuit’s patent caseload, even if it is over- or underinclusive in minor respects. 
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FIGURE 3: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS FROM 
DISTRICT COURTS 
 
 
B. Alice in the Federal Circuit: The Empirics 
Turning now to our main subject of interest: How has the 
Federal Circuit implemented the Alice decision?84 The Federal Circuit 
has issued 33 precedential opinions on patentable subject matter since 
the Supreme Court decided Alice in June 2014. As Figure 4 shows, 26 
of those 33 decisions (78.8%) found the patent invalid, while seven 
(21.2%) found the patent valid.85  
 
 84. The methodology we used to construct our database of post-Alice Federal Circuit decisions 
on patentable subject matter was straightforward: Using the Federal Circuit’s website, we—
building on the extraordinary work of Michael Kwun, see infra note 153—reviewed every merits 
decision the Federal Circuit issued over the time period of our study, June 20, 2014, to June 19, 
2017. For opinions that decided issues of patentable subject matter, we recorded information 
including the disposition of the case, the tribunal below, the date, the technological field of the 
patent or patents being reviewed, the individual judges’ votes, and the identity of the opinion 
author. For Rule 36 affirmances, we reviewed the appellant’s brief to see if the appeal involved an 
issue of patentable subject matter. If it did, we added to our database the same information as we 
recorded for the opinion cases minus, of course, the identity of the opinion author. 
 85. We’re of course aware of the adage that “[c]ourts do not find patents ‘valid,’ only that the 
patent challenger did not carry the ‘burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before 
the court.’ ” Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1987)). We use the word “valid” as shorthand for that lengthier statement of the relevant law. And 
though one might suggest that, as an appellate court, the Federal Circuit doesn’t “find” patents 
invalid (or valid)—instead it reviews district court and agency decisions making those findings—
the standard of review for patentable subject matter is de novo, OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
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FIGURE 4: FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS ON § 101, POST-
ALICE 
 
 
Thus, the post-Alice landscape seems bad for patentees but not 
catastrophic. Most Federal Circuit decisions invalidate the patent, but 
certainly not all of them. Indeed, since patentees overall win only 26% 
of their cases,86 a 21% win rate on eligibility might not look wildly out 
of line.87 
Looking only at precedential opinions, there’s more good news 
for patentees: the Federal Circuit appears to be reining in overzealous 
invalidations on the ground of patentable subject matter by the district 
courts and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), the tribunal 
within the PTO that conducts the new proceedings created by the 
America Invents Act.88 Although the Federal Circuit has found the 
 
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015), meaning that the distinction seems like one without a 
difference on this particular issue. That said, we realize that the Federal Circuit may implicitly 
give deference to the tribunals it oversees despite the formal standard of review, and we discuss 
that possibility below. See infra Section III.A. 
 86. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 2, at 1787. 
 87. However, even setting aside the fact that the 21% win rate on eligibility omits 
nonprecedential decisions, where patentees are much more likely to lose (as we discuss below), 
that comparison of the win rate on eligibility to the win rate overall would still be somewhat 
misleading. To win a patent case the patentee must win on all major issues. See Mark A. Lemley, 
The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 504, 506 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). Overall invalidity rates are around 43%, Allison et al., supra 
note 2, at 1801, so a 79% invalidity rate for patentable subject matter is already notably higher. 
 88. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)–(b) (2012). The PTAB also hears appeals from other types of 
proceedings at the PTO, including appeals from patent applicants who wish to challenge an 
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patent invalid in 78.8% of its post-Alice precedential opinions on 
patentable subject matter, the district court or the PTAB had found 
invalidity in whole or in part89 in a remarkable 97.0% (32 of 33) of those 
cases, as Figure 5 illustrates.90 Indeed, six of the seven Federal Circuit 
precedential opinions finding the patent to be valid reversed a district 
court decision that had invalidated the patent.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adverse decision by an examiner and from patentees who wish to challenge a decision in an ex 
parte reexamination. See id.  
 89. In the figures that follow, we identify cases in which the tribunal below found invalidity 
in part as “mixed” decisions. The mixed decisions in our dataset are: Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 
842 F.3d 1229, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the PTAB found numerous claims of three patents 
to be ineligible but found some claims of one of those patents to be eligible, and Intellectual 
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the district court 
found the asserted claims of two patents to be ineligible and the asserted claims of one other patent 
to be eligible. In both of those cases, the Federal Circuit found all of the relevant claims ineligible. 
See Ameranth, 842 F.3d at 1245; Intellectual Ventures, 838 F.3d at 1316, 1319, 1322.  
 90. Four of those 33 cases were appeals from PTAB proceedings. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. 
Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Ameranth, 842 F.3d at 1235–36; In re Smith, 815 
F.3d 816, 817 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015). The remaining 29 were appeals from a district court, with the exception of one appeal 
from the Court of Federal Claims, Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017). Because that case was a patent infringement suit filed against the U.S. government, 
for the remainder of this Article, we include it with the district court cases it closely resembles. We 
also generally combine district court appeals with PTO appeals for the purpose of reporting 
affirmance rates because the standard of review is the same (de novo, see supra note 85) and 
because most of the PTAB proceedings (10 of 16) were inter partes (not ex parte) proceedings that 
resemble district court litigation. Cf. Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness 
Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 735 (2013) (outlining reasons to 
be cautious about combining district court and PTO data).  
 91. The one exception is DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014), in which the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision denying the accused 
infringer’s motion for JMOL of invalidity under § 101. Of the Federal Circuit’s 24 precedential 
decisions finding invalidity, 22 affirmed rulings of invalidity by the tribunal below. The other two 
involved split rulings below. See supra note 89. 
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FIGURE 5: DISPOSITION BELOW IN CASES THAT RESULTED IN FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS ON § 101, POST-ALICE 
 
 
As noted, however, the Federal Circuit decides only a third of its 
cases by precedential opinion. In our dataset, there are 17 
nonprecedential opinions on patentable subject matter. Sixteen of those 
17 decisions found the patent to be invalid. Fourteen of those 16 
invalidity decisions affirmed district court or PTAB rulings invalidating 
the patent, while two reversed district court rulings that had upheld 
the patent.92 The one case upholding a patent in a nonprecedential 
opinion affirmed a district court decision that had found the patent 
valid.93  
Adding nonprecedential opinions to the mix changes the picture 
somewhat. The rates at which the Federal Circuit and the tribunals it 
reviews find invalidity begin to converge, though not entirely. As Figure 
6 illustrates, the Federal Circuit found invalidity in 42 of 50 cases 
(84.0%) in which it wrote an opinion, whether precedential or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92. Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x 977, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2017); LendingTree, LLC 
v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 93. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
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FIGURE 6: FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINIONS ON § 101, POST-ALICE 
 
 
By contrast, as Figure 7 shows, the lower tribunal had originally 
held the patent invalid in whole or in part in 46 of those 50 cases 
(92.0%). 
 
FIGURE 7: DISPOSITION BELOW IN CASES THAT RESULTED IN FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT OPINIONS ON § 101, POST-ALICE 
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Our picture is still not complete, however, because the majority 
of Federal Circuit decisions on patentable subject matter since Alice did 
not involve a written opinion at all. Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has 
decided 54 patentable subject matter cases under Rule 36.94 By 
definition, all 54 affirmed the tribunal below. Remarkably, every one of 
the Rule 36 affirmances affirmed a finding of invalidity. Including those 
cases, the Federal Circuit has allowed patents to survive in only eight 
of 104 total decisions on patentable subject matter since Alice, an 
invalidity rate of 92.3%, as Figure 8 illustrates. 
 
FIGURE 8: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON § 101, POST-ALICE 
 
 
As Figure 9 shows, the population of decisions reviewed by the 
Federal Circuit had an even higher rate of invalidity—the lower 
tribunal originally held the patent invalid in whole or in part in 100 of 
those 104 cases (96.2%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94. For a description of the methodology we used to identify these cases, see supra note 84. 
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FIGURE 9: DISPOSITION BELOW IN ALL FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON 
§ 101, POST-ALICE 
 
 
Once Rule 36 decisions are added to the mix, the difference in 
invalidity rates between the Federal Circuit and the tribunals it 
reviews largely disappears: 92.3% for the Federal Circuit, 96.2% for 
district courts and the PTAB. In stark contrast to the 21.2% rate of 
validity indicated by the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinions, 
patentees are, in fact, overwhelmingly losing in the Federal Circuit on 
patentable subject matter. And they are overwhelmingly losing in 
decisions that affirm a finding of invalidity by the tribunal below.  
It bears emphasizing that more than two-thirds of the Federal 
Circuit’s patentable subject matter decisions since Alice have generated 
no precedent, as Figure 10 shows. Though the law memorialized in the 
court’s precedential opinions is on its face not catastrophic for 
patentees, those opinions represent barely 30% of the court’s total 
decisions. By contrast, only one of the 71 nonprecedential opinions or 
Rule 36 affirmances favored the patentee.  
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FIGURE 10: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF ALL FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 101 
APPEALS, POST-ALICE 
 
 
A final wrinkle worth exploring involves the different technology 
areas in which patentable subject matter disputes arise. As discussed 
above, the Federal Circuit’s decisions on that issue fall into two broad 
categories: information technology (including business methods) and 
biotechnology (including medical diagnostics). Information technology 
accounts for the vast majority of decisions in our dataset: 98 out of 104.95 
As Table 1 illustrates, the Federal Circuit has found the patent to be 
valid in only seven of those 98 decisions (7.1%), consistent with the 
overall validity rate of 7.7%. In biotechnology cases, though the 
population is small, the validity rate is also relatively low, with the 
court having found the patent valid in only one out of six decisions 
(16.7%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95. Though they are not a perfect fit, for simplicity, we’ve included in the information 
technology/business methods category patents on gaming methods, In re Smith, 815 F.3d at 816; 
In re Webb, 609 F. App’x 643, 644 (Fed. Cir. 2015), a method of cutting hair, In re Brown, 645 F. 
App’x 1014, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and a method and apparatus for teaching Arabic to the blind, 
In re Alsabah, 677 F. App’x 684, 684 (Fed. Cir. 2017), all of which the Federal Circuit found 
ineligible after Alice. 
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TABLE 1: RESULTS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT POST-ALICE § 101 APPEALS, BY 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
The Federal Circuit’s publication practice in biotechnology 
cases, however, differs substantially from information technology cases, 
as Table 2 illustrates. The Federal Circuit has issued a precedential 
opinion in five of its six biotechnology-related patentable subject matter 
disputes.96 And the sixth decision, a Rule 36 affirmance, only qualifies 
as a biotechnology case because we’re considering that category to 
include any type of medical diagnostic and the patent involved a method 
of determining body temperature from a measurement taken at the 
forehead.97 Thus, although biotechnology patents account for only 5.8% 
of the Federal Circuit’s total decisions on patentable subject matter (six 
out of 104), they account for a much higher percentage of the court’s 
precedential opinions: 15.2% (five out of 33).  
 
TABLE 2: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT POST-ALICE 
§ 101 APPEALS, BY TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
In sum, the actual practice in the Federal Circuit looks rather 
different than what one would glean from simply reading the court’s 
precedent on patentable subject matter. Patentees win much less 
frequently than precedent suggests. They never win in Rule 36 
affirmances. And decisions involving biotechnology or medical 
diagnostics are rare. In the next Part, we discuss the implications of 
those results, provide some further analysis of our empirical data, and 
discuss the limitations of our study. 
 
 96. The five opinions are: Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer 
Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 97. Exergen Corp. v. Sanomedics Int’l Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App’x 760 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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III. DOES RULE 36 SKEW SUBSTANTIVE LAW? 
Patentees since Alice have done worse at the Federal Circuit 
than it appears from the court’s precedent. While they win a respectable 
number of precedential decisions (albeit still a clear minority), overall 
they have overwhelmingly lost patentable subject matter cases on 
appeal. That low win rate is obscured by the procedural vehicles the 
court has used to decide the cases. In this Part, we consider the 
implications of our findings for both substantive patent law and 
appellate procedure. 
A. Is Alice an Even Bigger Deal than We Thought? 
One possible implication is that we should worry even more (or 
celebrate even more, depending on one’s perspective) that many patents 
will not survive the new law of patentable subject matter. It may seem 
odd to suggest that patent lawyers should pay more attention to Alice; 
the decision has already created a whirlwind of attention in the 
academic and practice communities.98 Over the past year or so, 
however, one might have reasonably concluded that things were 
settling down into a less patent-hostile routine as the Federal Circuit 
issued several precedential opinions upholding patents against 
eligibility challenges.99 As noted above, those opinions drew, or at least 
attempted to draw, distinctions between patent claims that actually 
reflected (and were limited to) real technology and those that didn’t.100 
 
 98. As a small sample of post-Alice academic literature on patentable subject matter, see Dan 
L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
505 (2014); Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent-Ineligibility as Counteraction, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 955 
(2017); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973 
(2015); Dmitry Karshtedt, Photocopies, Patents, and Knowledge Transfer: “The Uneasy Case” of 
Justice Breyer’s Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1739 (2016); Amy L. 
Landers, Patentable Subject Matter as a Policy Driver, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 505 (2015); Jeffrey A. 
Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015); 
Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 45 (2015); Andres Sawicki, The 
Central Claiming Renaissance, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2968650 [https://perma.cc/GH7U-22LB]; Symposium, Cracking the Code: Ongoing 
Section 101 Patentability Concerns in Biotechnology and Computer Software, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1751 (2014); David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149 (2017).  
 99. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 52; see also Kevin Kabler & Andrew Whitehead, A More 
Consistent USPTO Approach to Patent Eligibility, LAW360 (July 17, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/942429/a-more-consistent-uspto-approach-to-patent-eligibility 
[https://perma.cc/R9XN-LJ45] (noting that recent Federal Circuit decisions upholding patents 
against eligibility challenges “suggest[ ] a more consistent, and less confusing, approach to patent 
eligibility determination[s] may be near”). 
 100. See supra Section I.B.  
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Our data cast doubt on any suggestion about the emergence of a more 
balanced regime of patentable subject matter.  
As Figure 11 shows, the percentage of Federal Circuit decisions 
finding invalidity has remained above 90% during each one-year period 
following Alice. Moreover, the raw number of invalidity decisions has 
more than doubled each year, likely reflecting the increasing frequency 
of successful patentable subject matter challenges in the district courts 
as the Supreme Court was issuing its string of decisions strengthening 
the eligibility requirement from 2010 to 2014.101 The reality might be 
even worse for patentees than our data suggest, as it seems possible 
that the high rates of invalidity could be deterring appeals in some cases 
or encouraging parties who do appeal to seek reversal on other grounds.  
 
FIGURE 11: FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 101 DECISIONS BY YEAR 
 
 
Sustained high rates of invalidity could also have significant 
implications for ongoing efforts at legislative reform. Influential 
interest groups have begun to lobby Congress to eliminate or 
 
 101. See Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 37 (reporting that the number of pleadings-stage 
eligibility dismissals by district courts increased from five in 2013 to 75 in 2016). 
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significantly weaken the patentable subject matter requirement.102 Our 
findings can’t say whether that legislation is desirable. But they do 
indicate that relaxing or eliminating the requirement would be a major 
change—it would significantly affect the results of many patent 
disputes.  
Before drawing any firm conclusions from our analysis, however, 
it’s worth noting that our results to date may not predict the future. 
Almost every case the Federal Circuit has decided since Alice has been 
an appeal from a ruling invalidating the patent. As illustrated in Figure 
9 above, in only six of the 104 cases in our dataset did the tribunal below 
find the patent valid, and two of those were mixed decisions upholding 
some claims and invalidating others. Consequently, the Federal Circuit 
has not had many opportunities to uphold validity, whether via Rule 36 
or otherwise. That could change once the Federal Circuit hears more 
appeals from decisions upholding patents, particularly patents that 
were prosecuted after Alice when the applicant and the PTO had the 
benefit of knowing the new standards of patent eligibility.103  
Our results might also indicate that the Federal Circuit is 
simply deferring on the issue of patentable subject matter to the 
tribunals it reviews. As Figure 12 shows, the Federal Circuit has 
affirmed the decision below in 94 of 104 (90.4%) of its post-Alice 
decisions. Though data on the Federal Circuit’s overall rates of 
affirmances and reversals is notoriously inconsistent, no studies put the 
reversal rate below the less-than-10% figure we have found on the issue 
of patentable subject matter.104  
 
 
 
 
 
 102. See Dennis Crouch, AIPLA on Board with Statutory Reform of 101, PATENTLY-O (May 16, 
2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/aipla-statutory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/9BPE-
PHYF] (discussing amendments to § 101 proposed by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association and the Intellectual Property Owners Association). 
 103. Cf. David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1549 (2014) 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s practice of applying new precedent retroactively to patents that 
have already issued). 
 104. See Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics, and 
the Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227, 239–40 (2016) (describing studies reporting reversal 
rates ranging from 11% to 54%). 
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FIGURE 12: DISPOSITION OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 101 APPEALS, POST-
ALICE 
 
 
As a strictly doctrinal matter, the Federal Circuit should not be 
deferring to lower tribunals because patent eligibility is a question of 
law reviewed de novo.105 But this would not be the first time the Federal 
Circuit has deferred on appeal in defiance of the formal standard of 
review.106  
If it’s true that the Federal Circuit is mostly just deferring to 
district courts and the PTAB, we should see the patentee win rate 
improve if the court gets more appeals from decisions upholding 
patents, particularly patents prosecuted after Alice. An increase in 
appeals upholding patents may not occur in appeals from the PTAB 
 
 105. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Contra 
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (arguably creating a split within the 
Federal Circuit on this issue by stating that eligibility involves underlying questions of fact subject 
to deferential review). For a discussion of factual issues that potentially underpin the eligibility 
inquiry, see infra note 148. 
 106. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, 
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) (identifying 
an era of “informal deference” on the issue of claim construction based on a reversal rate of around 
20%). Another possibility is that the Federal Circuit’s growing caseload overall, see supra Figure 
1, is pushing the court to affirm cases more frequently across the board—a dynamic that appears 
to exist on other courts of appeals. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 
1115 (2011) (discussing the Second Circuit). For a detailed analysis of how inattention to formal 
standards of review can cause systemic doctrinal shifts, see Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643 (2015). 
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because of the peculiarities of the administrative process,107 but it could 
occur in cases appealed from district courts, which account for the vast 
majority of patentable subject matter decisions (88 out of 104) in our 
dataset. District court decisions overall are not nearly as likely to find 
invalidity as the decisions we analyze.108 What the Federal Circuit has 
seen in the three years since Alice are primarily rulings that occurred 
pretrial. Many defendants have challenged patents under Alice on a 
motion to dismiss or an early summary judgment motion.109 If those 
motions are granted, the case is generally over and an appeal follows. 
By contrast, if the district court denies the motion, the case will 
continue in the district court, either to trial or, more frequently, to a 
settlement. So cases in which the district court grants an Alice motion 
are more likely to be appealed, and will be appealed sooner, than cases 
upholding the patent. Lastly, one might reasonably infer that the 
patents challenged on eligibility grounds in the immediate wake of Alice 
have been those that were most obviously invalid.110 Once those easy 
invalidations are finished (and once patentees are deterred from 
 
 107. Several factors make it unlikely that the Federal Circuit will hear many appeals 
challenging PTAB rulings confirming validity. To begin with, the PTAB accounts for a small 
fraction of Federal Circuit decisions on patentable subject matter—only 16 of the 104 decisions in 
our dataset. Most of those PTAB decisions (10 out of 16) originated in the covered business method 
review program, which may not exist in two years. See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 
§ 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. 284, 330–31 (2011) (sunset provision). Also, for a patent to even enter the 
covered business method review program, the PTAB must have determined that it is “more likely 
than not” that at least one claim of the patent is invalid, 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012); America Invents 
Act § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 329–30, which means that any patent entering the program is probably 
doomed. (And if the PTAB refuses to institute the proceeding, effectively upholding validity, that 
decision is not appealable. 35 U.S.C. § 324(e).) Moreover, patentable subject matter cannot be 
challenged in the most popular PTAB proceeding, inter partes review. See id. § 311(b) (permitting 
review only on the grounds of anticipation and obviousness). Although the PTAB can consider 
patentable subject matter in the new post-grant review proceeding, see id. § 321(b), it’s not yet 
clear how extensively that proceeding will be used because of the stringent timeline for filing a 
petition and statutory estoppel provisions that require accused infringers to forgo certain 
invalidity arguments in any future infringement litigation. See Gugliuzza, supra note 82, at 282–
84. The PTO will, of course, continue to consider the patentable subject matter requirement during 
examination, but appeals from examination consist entirely of decisions rejecting applications for 
failure to satisfy patentability requirements; decisions approving a patent application cannot be 
appealed. See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011); Melissa F. 
Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 385 (2011). Thus, if the Federal Circuit is going to hear more appeals upholding 
eligibility, those appeals will likely come from the district courts. 
 108. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology 
Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility Challenges, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 22), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050093 
[https://perma.cc/Y5RW-VBWE] (reporting a 61.8% invalidity rate in the district courts from June 
2014 to February 2017). 
 109. See id. at 23 (reporting that, from June 2012 to February 2017, 69.4% of district court 
decisions on eligibility (249 of 359) were made on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the 
pleadings and that another 27.0% (97 of 359) were made on a motion for summary judgment). 
 110. See Gugliuzza, supra note 68, at 46. 
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asserting patents similar to the ones invalidated), patentee win rates 
might begin to increase.  
In short, our dataset is relatively small and is overwhelmingly 
composed of appeals from decisions of invalidity. As the composition of 
appeals changes, so might our results.  
B. Is the Federal Circuit Changing the Law Through the Way It 
Decides Cases? 
The fact that most Federal Circuit decisions invalidating patents 
under Alice—but none of the decisions upholding patents—are hidden 
from view by Rule 36 may affect the long-term development of the 
law.111  
We would be most concerned if there were reason to think the 
Federal Circuit was deliberately skewing perceptions about the results 
of patentable subject matter cases by promoting decisions finding 
patents valid and demoting decisions finding them invalid. The Federal 
Circuit is, of course, not a monolithic entity, which makes it unlikely 
that the court as a whole has intentionally tried to distort perceptions 
of the law. That said, it is possible that individual judges might be 
inclined not to write or to join opinions endorsing positions they dislike, 
even if they feel compelled to vote in a certain way because of Supreme 
Court precedent.112 
To test for these possibilities, we collected information on how 
each Federal Circuit judge voted in each post-Alice patentable subject 
matter case in our dataset. We then compared each judge’s propensity 
to vote in favor of validity on patentable subject matter to the judge’s 
 
 111.  Some have expressed another concern—that the court is not actually paying as much 
attention to Rule 36 cases as it does to those in which it writes opinions. See Gene Quinn & Peter 
Harter, Rule 36, Collateral Estoppel and Unequal Treatment at the Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG 
(Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/25/rule-36-collateral-estoppel-unequal-
treatment-federal-circuit/id=82480/ [https://perma.cc/7PS7-UHUA] (“When you don’t have to show 
your work how can you or anyone else really be sure that the decision is fair, done after a full 
consideration of the issues presented and arguments made, and without making a mistake?”). We 
aren’t particularly concerned by this. The Federal Circuit has noted that Rule 36 judgments 
“receive the full consideration of the Court of Appeals, and are no less carefully decided than the 
cases in which [the court] issues full opinions.” Phil-Insul Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co., 854 F.3d 
1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The fact that a case is not selected for Rule 36 affirmance until after 
bench memos are written and oral argument is held, unlike the practice in many other circuits, 
makes the court’s statement credible. While it’s true that writing an opinion can sometimes surface 
issues that might otherwise go unnoticed, that is likely to be rare when the district court opinion, 
briefing, and oral argument have all failed to raise those issues. The question of hiding complex 
issues in Rule 36 cases, as opposed to finding the case easy to decide under existing law, is 
potentially more problematic; we take it up below. See infra Section III.B. 
 112. See Ben Grunwald, Strategic Publication, 92 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with 
authors) (documenting the phenomenon of concealing disagreement on the merits by not 
publishing the resulting opinion in the regional circuits). 
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propensity to cast a vote invalidating a patent on that ground in a Rule 
36 affirmance. The hypothesis is that judges who are more likely to vote 
to uphold validity are also more likely to cast invalidity votes in 
“hidden” decisions under Rule 36 as opposed to written opinions. We 
present our results in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 13 and 14.  
Table 3 lists, for each active Federal Circuit judge, the raw 
number of their “valid” and “invalid” votes in post-Alice cases involving 
§ 101’s patentable subject matter requirement, as well as the 
percentage of their total § 101 votes that are “valid” votes.113 As Table 
3 illustrates, Judge Newman has the strongest propensity to uphold a 
patent, having voted in favor of validity in three out of 15 decisions 
(20%). At the other end, Judges Lourie and Dyk have not cast a single 
vote in favor of validity since Alice. 
 
TABLE 3: FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES’ VOTES IN POST-ALICE § 101 
DECISIONS 
 
 
Table 4 then lists, again for each active judge, the raw number 
of their invalid votes in § 101 cases, the number of those votes that were 
cast in cases decided via Rule 36, and the percentage of each judge’s 
invalid votes cast via Rule 36.  
 
 
 113. In this initial analysis of voting data, we exclude visiting judges and judges who were on 
senior status as of the end of our collection period. We discuss below how our results change if we 
include the votes of some of those judges. See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.  
Gugliuzza & Lemley_Galley (Do Not Delete) 4/5/2018  10:43 AM 
798 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:765 
TABLE 4: FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES’ INVALIDITY VOTES IN POST-ALICE 
§ 101 DECISIONS 
 
 
Though the number of total § 101 votes by any given judge is 
relatively small (a maximum of 29 and a minimum of 15, as one can 
calculate from Table 3), some possibility of correlation between overall 
voting behavior on § 101 and mode of disposition is apparent, at least 
for particular judges. For example, Judge Newman—who, again, is the 
judge most likely to vote in favor of validity—is also the judge most 
likely to cast a vote of invalidity via Rule 36, having cast 9 out of her 12 
invalid votes (75%) in that fashion. At the other end, Chief Judge 
Prost—who, as Table 3 illustrated, is among the least likely to vote in 
favor of validity, having done so in only 1 out of 22 cases (4.5%)—is also 
the least likely to cast an invalidity vote via Rule 36, having cast only 8 
of her 21 invalid votes (38.1%) in that fashion. Both of those examples 
are consistent with a hypothesis that judges’ overall voting propensity 
on § 101 may predict their use of Rule 36. 
To that end, it’s interesting to note that, on the Federal Circuit, 
the panel’s presiding judge assigns authorship responsibility114 and 
that Judges Newman and Prost are either extremely likely (Newman) 
or guaranteed (Prost) to be the presiding judge on any panel. As chief, 
Judge Prost presides on any panel on which she sits. As the senior-most 
active judge, Judge Newman presides on any panel that does not 
 
 114. FED. CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE 8.2. 
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include Chief Judge Prost.115 Thus, Judges Newman and Prost exert 
significant influence over the mode of disposition in cases in which they 
participate. The (admittedly limited) data we have gathered suggest 
that they could, in fact, be using that influence to implement 
preferences to dispose of cases reaching particular results in particular 
ways.116  
To test our hypothesis more formally, we ran a simple linear 
regression asking whether a judge’s propensity to cast an invalidity vote 
on § 101 via Rule 36 might be explained by the judge’s overall 
propensity to vote in favor of validity on that issue. Figure 13 reflects 
our results.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115. Id. at 1.2. 
 116. In a similar vein, evidence from other circuits suggests that judges in the minority on an 
issue will sometimes agree to unanimity in exchange for issuing the decision without an opinion. 
See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 192–
93 (1998). It should be noted that the norm of allowing the panel’s more junior judges to speak first 
at conference, a norm we understand the Federal Circuit to follow, could partly reduce the 
presiding judge’s influence over the mode of disposition. And, to be clear, strategic behavior is not 
the only explanation for our results (or even the most likely one). See generally infra Section III.C. 
For example, one might note that Judge Newman’s general propensity to uphold validity means 
that the only patents she would vote to invalidate are those that are most plainly invalid and 
therefore most appropriate for Rule 36 treatment by the terms of the rule itself. But a similar 
explanation about the faithful application of Rule 36 would not necessarily hold for judges such as 
Chief Judge Prost whose propensities tilt the opposite direction—likely to invalidate and unlikely 
to use Rule 36 to do so. If a judge thought that most patents challenged under § 101 were obviously 
invalid, we might expect that judge to use Rule 36 a lot, too, since the judge would view many § 101 
cases to be easy ones. Yet we see the opposite—judges who tend to think most patents challenged 
under § 101 are invalid also generate a lot of precedent to support their view.  
 117. We report the full results of our regression analysis in Appendix B. 
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FIGURE 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 101 VOTES AND USE OF RULE 36 
FOR ACTIVE FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES 
 
 
As the data suggest, there is a modest correlation, with a judge’s 
propensity to vote in favor of validity on § 101 explaining 24% of the 
odds that a post-Alice § 101 decision will be disposed of via opinion or 
Rule 36. Though the correlation is not statistically significant (p = 
0.106), that changes if we expand our dataset to include the votes of 
judges who are not active Federal Circuit judges but who have cast 10 
or more votes in post-Alice § 101 cases. In total, eight judges who are 
not active Federal Circuit judges have cast votes in those cases. Those 
eight judges account for 45 of the 311 total votes in our dataset.118 Two 
of those eight judges have cast 10 or more votes: Judges Bryson (11 
votes, all invalid, six via Rule 36) and Mayer (10 votes, all invalid, four 
via Rule 36), both of whom are Federal Circuit judges on senior status. 
None of the other six judges have cast more than seven votes.119 If we 
include Judges Bryson and Mayer in our regression, the correlation 
becomes statistically significant at a 5% level (p = 0.043), with a judge’s 
propensity to vote in favor of validity on § 101 now explaining 30% of 
 
 118. For a full list of the votes cast in § 101 cases by judges who are not active Federal Circuit 
judges, see infra Appendix C. 
 119. Interestingly, only one of the 45 total votes cast by judges who are not active Federal 
Circuit judges was a vote to uphold validity. See Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 
F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Senior Judge Plager, writing the opinion for the court).  
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the odds that a post-Alice § 101 decision will be disposed of via opinion 
or Rule 36.120 Figure 14 reflects this analysis. 
 
FIGURE 14: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 101 VOTES AND USE OF RULE 36 
FOR ACTIVE FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGES PLUS JUDGES BRYSON AND 
MAYER 
 
 
In short, though it is hard to draw firm conclusions about the 
relationship between overall voting behavior and the propensity to use 
Rule 36, the limited evidence available post-Alice is intriguing and 
warrants close attention going forward, as a larger number of decisions 
will permit more robust statistical analysis.121 
 
 120. For the full results of this revised regression analysis, see infra Appendix D. It’s also 
worth noting that the two active judges who appear to be outliers, Judge Newman and Chief Judge 
Prost, play a key role in fueling the overall correlation between voting propensity on validity under 
§ 101 and propensity to participate in Rule 36 affirmances. If those judges are removed from the 
regression (and Judges Bryson and Mayer are also omitted), the R-square decreases to 0.027 and 
the p-value increases to 0.65. For the full results of that regression analysis, see infra Appendix 
E. 
 121. One final note: though our dataset contains 104 decisions, it contains only 311 votes, not 
the 312 votes one would expect from 104 decisions by panels of three judges, because one case was 
decided by a two-judge panel. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
Also, one vote was a mixed vote to find some claims valid and others invalid. Intellectual Ventures 
I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Stoll, J., dissenting in part). To 
avoid complications, we have excluded that one mixed vote from the preceding analysis of 
individual judges’ voting data. 
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Another interesting question is how the court’s use of Rule 36 in 
patentable subject matter cases compares to its use of Rule 36 in other 
areas of law.122 As shown in Figure 10 above, the court has decided 
51.9% of its post-Alice patentable subject matter appeals through Rule 
36 affirmances, 31.7% through precedential opinions, and 16.3% 
through nonprecedential opinions. Figure 15 below provides data on the 
mode of disposition for all Federal Circuit appeals (including patentable 
subject matter cases) from the district courts and the PTO in the three-
year period following Alice. As that figure shows, the court has overall 
decided only 41.7% of its cases through Rule 36 affirmances—10% less 
than in patentable subject matter cases alone.  
 
FIGURE 15: MODE OF DISPOSITION OF ALL FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS 
FROM DISTRICT COURTS AND THE PTO, POST-ALICE 
 
 
At first blush, a 10 percentage point difference might not seem 
consequential. For several reasons, however, it’s actually quite 
 
 122. Previous studies have performed this comparison for other issues of patent doctrine. 
Notably, then-professor (now Federal Circuit judge) Kimberly Moore studied Federal Circuit claim 
construction decisions in the wake of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 
(1996) (holding that the judge, not the jury, must interpret the claims of the patent), and found 
that the court used Rule 36 less frequently than in other types of cases, “despite the intuition that 
[claim construction decisions] would be the least likely to have precedential value.” Moore, supra 
note 2, at 237. Moore also found that, once Rule 36 affirmances were taken into account, the 
Federal Circuit’s reversal rate in claim construction appeals was lower than previous studies had 
suggested. Id. at 235–37. 
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surprising to find that the Federal Circuit uses Rule 36 with greater 
frequency in patentable subject matter cases than in other types of 
cases. First, almost all patentable subject matter appeals come from 
district courts,123 not the PTAB, and the Federal Circuit is, overall, 
much less likely to use Rule 36 in appeals from district courts as 
opposed to the PTAB. In 2016, the Federal Circuit used Rule 36 to 
resolve 50.5% of PTO appeals overall.124 By contrast, the Federal 
Circuit disposed of only 35.6% of district court appeals via Rule 36, and 
that number would be smaller still if we excluded patentable subject 
matter cases, where the Federal Circuit uses Rule 36 with a higher-
than-average frequency.125  
Second, Rule 36 is commonly used in circumstances in which the 
Federal Circuit is deferring to the finder of fact.126 Indeed, deference to 
fact-finding underlies the first two bases listed in Rule 36 for entering 
a judgment without opinion.127 But patentable subject matter is a 
question of law reviewed without deference.128  
Finally, many Rule 36 decisions outside the patentable subject 
matter context come in well-settled areas of law like novelty and 
nonobviousness that are the subject of dozens or hundreds of 
precedential decisions, so the incremental benefit of one additional 
opinion is small. Other types of disputes ripe for Rule 36 treatment 
involve questions of claim construction or infringement that are highly 
case specific and offer little precedential value.129 In patentable subject 
matter, by contrast, courts are making the law as they go. And the 
common law, “I know it when I see it” nature of post-Alice doctrine130 
means that providing additional signposts for lawyers could be more 
important here than in other fields.  
 
 123. Eighty-eight of the 104 cases in our dataset. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. See supra Figures 2–3. 
 125. In 2016, the Federal Circuit used Rule 36 to dispose of 55.0% (22 of 40) of its patentable 
subject matter appeals from district courts. See infra Appendix A. 
 126. See Rachel Hughey, How to Get to Federal Circuit Rule 36, LAW360 (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/684264/how-to-get-to-federal-circuit-rule-36 [https://perma.cc/ 
UR6Q-BNXY] (suggesting that, to obtain a Rule 36 affirmance, “an appellee should urge that the 
case hinges on the facts and is entitled to a highly deferential standard of review”). 
 127. See FED. CIR. R. 36(a)–(b) (“The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without 
opinion, citing this rule, when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an 
opinion would have no precedential value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court 
appealed from is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous; [or] (b) the evidence supporting 
the jury’s verdict is sufficient . . . .”). 
 128. See supra note 105. 
 129. See supra note 122. 
 130. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. CV 14-154, 2014 WL 4407592, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 4, 2014) (Wu, J.) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)).  
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C. The Proper Role of Rule 36 
Our findings about the Federal Circuit’s use of Rule 36 in 
patentable subject matter cases also have implications for the ongoing 
debate over whether Rule 36 is wise or lawful. The dispute over the 
Rule’s legality centers on 35 U.S.C. § 144, which provides that the 
Federal Circuit, after deciding an appeal from the PTO, “shall issue to 
the Director its mandate and opinion.”131 The argument that Rule 36 is 
unlawful is that § 144 requires the Federal Circuit to issue an opinion 
in every case appealed from the PTO.132  
We won’t dwell long on the legal argument because § 144 applies 
only to appeals from the PTO and, as noted, most patentable subject 
matter appeals arise from the district courts. But there are reasons to 
be skeptical of any argument that Rule 36 is illegal. For starters, 
appellate courts have, for better or worse, long engaged in the practice 
of affirming without writing an opinion.133 In fact, since 1967, Rule 36 
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure has explicitly authorized 
the federal courts of appeals to render judgment with no opinion.134 As 
the Supreme Court recently held in a decision involving the patent 
venue statute, if Congress wants to overturn a settled practice of the 
federal courts, it must make its intent clear in the text of the statute.135 
We doubt the relevant language of § 144 would pass that bar. It doesn’t 
explicitly require an opinion in every case. And it was enacted in 1984, 
nearly two decades after the enactment of Appellate Rule 36 and at a 
time by which the practice of issuing decisions without opinion was well 
established as a general matter,136 even if the practice had not yet 
caught on in the Federal Circuit,137 which, at the time, was barely two 
years old.  
 
 131. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 132. See Crouch, supra note 4, at 562. 
 133. See, e.g., Philip Marcus, Affirmance Without Opinion, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 212, 213–14 
(1937); Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 486, 491 (1930). But 
cf. DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND 
PERSONNEL 561 (2d ed. 2006) (outlining divergent practices among the various federal and state 
appellate courts). 
 134. FED. R. APP. P. 36(a) (“A judgment is entered when it is noted on the docket. The clerk 
must prepare, sign, and enter the judgment: (1) after receiving the court’s opinion—but if settlement 
of the judgment’s form is required, after final settlement; or (2) if a judgment is rendered without 
an opinion, as the court instructs.” (emphasis added)). 
 135. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017) (“When 
Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication 
of its intent in the text of the amended provision.”). 
 136. See Dowd, supra note 4, at 34–42 (recounting the legislative history of the amendment). 
 137. See Crouch, supra note 4, at 568 (noting that the Federal Circuit adopted Rule 36 in 1989). 
But see Dowd, supra note 4, at 44 (noting that one of the Federal Circuit’s predecessors, the Court 
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Even assuming the Federal Circuit is legally permitted to 
dispose of over half of its patentable subject matter cases without an 
opinion, there remains a policy question about whether that practice is 
good for the patent system. On one hand, the Alice inquiry is a common 
law, fact-specific analysis, and examples are probably the best way to 
flesh out the contours of the test. On the other hand, the Federal 
Circuit’s time and energy are finite. The court’s frequent use of Rule 36 
might demonstrate merely that it views many § 101 appeals as easy 
cases given the Supreme Court’s obvious skepticism of software and 
business method patents, which account for the overwhelming majority 
of patentable subject matter challenges decided by the Federal 
Circuit.138 More examples might be useful, but the judges of the Federal 
Circuit should have some discretion about where to direct their opinion-
writing efforts.  
One might, of course, view the disproportionate number of 
precedential opinions upholding validity as evidence of the court trying 
to undermine Supreme Court precedent hostile to patentees. Indeed, 
our data suggest the possibility that individual judges could use Rule 
36 to counteract that precedent. But one could just as easily view the 
Federal Circuit’s tendency to write precedential opinions when 
upholding patents as reflecting an intermediate appellate court that is 
simply doing its job in implementing the somewhat ambiguous 
eligibility decisions the Supreme Court has issued. Viewed through that 
lens, the Federal Circuit, by writing precedential opinions upholding 
validity that can be compared to the large body of precedent invaliding 
patents on eligibility grounds, is providing something similar to the 
percolation that occurs among the various regional courts of appeals in 
other areas of law.139 And even if one characterized the Federal Circuit 
as trying to resist Supreme Court precedent, any resistance is having 
only a modest effect—nearly 80% of the Federal Circuit’s precedential 
opinions still invalidate the asserted patent.  
Rather than resistance by the Federal Circuit, two other 
considerations more likely explain the disproportionate number of 
precedential opinions upholding validity. First, because of the high rate 
of invalidity in the tribunals it reviews, the Federal Circuit has had few 
 
of Customs and Patent Appeals, occasionally issued very short affirmances with practically no 
substantive reasoning). 
 138. See supra Tables 1–2. 
 139. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme 
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 795 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal 
Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 352–64 (2014); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Patent 
Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1094 (2014) (exploring the benefits of a “dialogic” relationship 
among the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court, and Congress on matters of patent law). 
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opportunities to even consider affirming a ruling of validity via Rule 36. 
Because findings of invalidity on patentable subject matter are the 
norm in district courts and at the PTAB, a Federal Circuit decision 
affirming invalidity is hardly surprising and is therefore more likely to 
warrant an opinionless or nonprecedential disposition under the 
Federal Circuit’s governing rules. By contrast, a decision upholding a 
patent against a patentable subject matter challenge is more unusual 
and thus more likely to warrant a precedential opinion.140 As we showed 
in Tables 1 and 2, information technology cases striking down patents 
are not uncommon, but biotechnology cases of any sort are uncommon, 
which would explain the court’s practice of writing precedential 
opinions in practically every biotechnology case its sees while 
frequently affirming via Rule 36 in the information technology cases 
that compromise the bulk of the Federal Circuit’s § 101 docket.  
Second, by writing a precedential opinion in nearly every case in 
which it finds a patent to be valid, the court is also responding to the 
demands of its audience, as a semi-specialized court such as the Federal 
Circuit might be expected to do.141 Alice, decided in June 2014, was the 
fourth Supreme Court decision in four years ruling against the patentee 
on patentable subject matter. By the time the Federal Circuit issued its 
first post-Alice opinion upholding validity in December 2014,142 the 
Federal Circuit’s audience—patent applicants, litigants, district judges, 
and the PTO—desperately needed examples of inventions that 
remained patent eligible. An ongoing desire for examples is clear from 
the frequent guidance that the PTO issues to its examining corps (and 
that is widely read by patent practitioners) after many precedential 
Federal Circuit decisions on patentable subject matter.143 The examples 
provided by the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinions are also 
critically important to practice on the ground. The PTO, for instance, 
has instructed its examiners that they should not reject an application 
 
 140. A similar but more general observation relates to the fact that, to invalidate a patent, the 
court needs to find only one good argument against validity, so if there’s an easy argument for 
invalidity, the court can ignore the hard issues. To uphold validity, by contrast, the court must 
consider every argument the challenger raises and reject it. Because a decision upholding validity 
must engage the hard issues, it’s more likely that such a decision would merit a precedential 
opinion. 
 141. See BAUM, supra note 6, at 99. 
 142. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 143. The PTO’s extensive library of patentable subject matter guidance is available at Subject 
Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-
regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility (last visited Jan. 19, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/7JBD-RB7A]. 
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for claiming an abstract idea unless the claimed invention is similar to 
something the courts have previously identified as an abstract idea.144 
The Federal Circuit’s sensitivity to its audience’s need for 
examples is clearest in biotechnology cases. Uncertainty over 
patentability flourished in that field after Mayo.145 Yet the court has 
received few biotechnology appeals to date, so it has capitalized on every 
opportunity it has had to provide guidance to the bar, the district courts, 
and the PTO.  
In short, the Federal Circuit has, in its precedential opinions, 
delivered the types of examples its audience needed. But those opinions 
now provide an inaccurate picture of how disputes over patentable 
subject matter are actually resolved.146  
It’s tough to say whether the disproportionate number of 
precedential decisions favoring patentees has actually skewed 
substantive law. On one hand, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, the rates of 
invalidity in the Federal Circuit and in the decisions appealed to the 
Federal Circuit are both over 90%, suggesting that the Federal Circuit, 
district courts, and the PTAB are applying the patentable subject 
matter requirement in a consistent fashion. As we also noted, however, 
the actual invalidity rate in the district courts is lower—some evidence 
suggests it’s around 60%.147 But few decisions upholding patents have 
been appealed to date. And many of them may never be appealed due 
 
 144. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, JULY 2015 UPDATE: SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY 3 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-
update.pdf [https://perma.cc/85LZ-TGEH] (“This discussion is meant to guide examiners and 
ensure that a claimed concept is not identified as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least 
one concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.”). 
 145. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized 
Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1911 (2016) (describing how the Supreme Court’s 
“adherence to standards over rules in many § 101 cases [has] fostered confusion among the lower 
courts and within the Federal Circuit” and arguing that “uncertainty . . . affects incentives to 
innovate, as scientists and investors may be reluctant to move forward with product development 
if they cannot determine whether they will be able to protect their investment”); see also Bernard 
Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1386 (2014) (“Many patents in the 
biotechnology, medical diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at their 
core. But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have added ‘enough’ to the claims to 
render them patent eligible.”). 
 146. Descriptively, one might conceptualize this disconnect between the results in precedential 
opinions and the results in eligibility disputes overall as a variety of “selective transmission”—
with the court hiding parts of the law from public view in order to achieve broader normative goals. 
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 635, 667 (1984) (defending the use of selective transmission against 
arguments that it is inconsistent with the rule of law).  
 147. See Lefstin et al., supra note 108, at 22. 
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to settlements or strategic choices by the parties about what arguments 
to pursue as a case moves forward.148  
Understanding how the Federal Circuit is using Rule 36 in 
patentable subject matter cases is important. Litigants and 
policymakers need to understand that while the law, as it is articulated 
in precedential appellate opinions, may be setting out guideposts for 
what is and isn’t patentable subject matter, the overwhelming majority 
of patents challenged under § 101 are failing the test. In other words, 
the Federal Circuit’s post-Alice precedential opinions set out a 
“framework” of patentable subject matter doctrine, with a handful of 
decisions defining the overarching structure of the law. While that 
framework has the benefit of providing a small number of clearly 
identified doctrinal points of reference, it lacks the information that 
becomes evident when one looks, as we have in this Article, at the entire 
population of patentable subject matter decisions. On the whole, those 
decisions reach different results than the precedential opinions alone. 
But the entire population of decisions—what the Federal Circuit does 
“in fact”149—is what, in our view, defines the real contours of patentable 
subject matter doctrine. 
We think, therefore, that more transparency as to the nature of 
the issues decided would be appropriate, allowing those with an interest 
in patent law to understand what the law actually is in practice, not 
 
 148. Indeed, the arguments about lack of inventiveness or overbreadth that usually form the 
basis for a § 101 motion often become subsumed within arguments about anticipation, 
obviousness, or adequate disclosure, in part because most courts treat patentable subject matter 
as a question of law that is definitively resolved by the judge, usually before trial. See, e.g., 
ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1112, 2016 WL 1637280, at *6 (E.D. Tex. 
Apr. 25, 2016) (denying Apple’s post-trial motion for JMOL of ineligibility, noting that the issue of 
eligibility was not submitted to the jury and speculating that “[p]erhaps [Apple’s] motion is 
actually a motion for reconsideration” of the court’s denial of Apple’s request for judgment on the 
pleadings). Thus, an accused infringer who loses a § 101 motion will understandably move on to 
emphasize other grounds of invalidity that will be given to the jury—even though, it should be 
noted, many of those grounds present questions of law, too. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries 
Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1727 (2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit has 
endorsed the practice of sending the ultimate question of validity to the jury but questioning that 
approach to resolving questions of law); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Procedure of Patent 
Eligibility, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with authors) (questioning whether patentable 
subject matter presents solely a question of law). As this Article was going to press, the Federal 
Circuit issued two decisions that, unlike many of the court’s other post-Alice decisions, emphasized 
that questions of fact can sometimes underpin the § 101 analysis. See Aatrix Software, Inc. v. 
Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that factual allegations 
in the plaintiff’s complaint about the patent’s inventiveness defeated a motion to dismiss on § 101 
grounds); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the question 
of whether claim elements are “conventional” for § 101 purposes is a question of fact). 
 149. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), 
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 994 (1997). 
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just what the precedential opinions say.150 To be clear, we’re not 
arguing that the Federal Circuit should write a precedential opinion in 
every patentable subject matter case. But many lawyers don’t have the 
time (or the financial resources) to dig through dockets and briefs—as 
we have done to prepare this Article—to determine the basis for the 
nearly 200 Rule 36 affirmances the Federal Circuit issues every year. A 
short, nonprecedential opinion making clear the arguments raised by 
the appellant (and rejected by the court) would provide valuable 
information. To address any concern that an increase in 
nonprecedential opinions would distract the court from its work in more 
important or difficult cases or that the court would be overwhelmed by 
lawyers citing and relying on nonprecedential opinions in their briefs,151 
the opinions need not (and probably should not) contain elaborate 
reasoning. But simply indicating the legal issues considered and 
rejected would help reduce any misconceptions about how patent 
appeals are actually resolved. Alternatively, the court itself (or perhaps 
the Office of the Chief Economist at the PTO) could collect and regularly 
publish data about the issues raised in cases disposed of via Rule 36.152 
At minimum, we hope this Article calls attention to the need for 
scholars, the media, lawyers, and anyone else interested in the patent 
system to keep a close eye on how “silent” affirmances under Rule 36 
may be altering substantive law. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study sheds light on the important question of how the law 
on the books differs from the actual experience of litigants. Some of our 
findings confirm the conventional wisdom among patent lawyers and 
 
 150. Cf. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 285 (1996) 
(criticizing “no opinion” affirmances, such as those issued under Federal Circuit Rule 36, on the 
ground that “[e]xplanation” of the basis for a decision “is fundamental to our system of justice”). 
 151. The judges of the Federal Circuit raised similar concerns when opposing the 2006 
adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which overturned prior circuit court rules 
prohibiting the citation of nonprecedential opinions. See, e.g., Letter from Haldane Robert Mayer, 
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to Peter G. McCable, Sec’y, Comm. on 
Rules of Practice & Procedure, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 6, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/03-AP-086.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DEY-
A323].  
 152. Until 2011, the Federal Circuit Clerk’s Office published more detailed data about the 
court’s caseload than is currently available on the court’s website. See Jason Rantanen, Federal 
Circuit Statistics–FY 2011, PATENTLYO (Oct. 26, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/10/ 
federal-circuit-statistics-fy-2011.html [https://perma.cc/LH4C-QSVJ] (reporting the updated data 
and removal of previous data). Observers have expressed disappointment about this change in 
practice. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1488 
n.278 (2012); Rantanen, supra.  
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scholars. For example, patentees lose a lot of patentable subject matter 
disputes, particularly at the Federal Circuit. But someone who’s 
familiar mainly with the court’s precedential opinions might be 
surprised by the magnitude of patentees’ loss rate, which exceeds 90%. 
We also highlighted some intriguing differences in how the court 
decides to dispose of a case—whether through a precedential opinion, 
nonprecedential opinion, or Rule 36 affirmance—depending on the 
result the court reaches. It will be interesting to see if those patterns 
change as the Federal Circuit reviews more decisions upholding patent 
validity against § 101 challenges and as patent drafters adjust their 
behavior to account for the new law of patentable subject matter.  
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APPENDIX A 
Federal Circuit Decisions on Patentable Subject Matter 
June 20, 2014 through June 19, 2017153 
 
Precedential Opinions 
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) 
Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent 
Litig., 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 
F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) 
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
 
 153. An updated list of the Federal Circuit’s post-Alice decisions on patentable subject matter 
can be found at 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1b5HL66qJG3B1N2qi9EKZuVhl0R2TUX9J2EnHUq3clQc 
[https://perma.cc/4JQR-2LX4].  
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Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial, LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) 
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) 
Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) 
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Nonprecedential Opinions 
Allvoice Devs. US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 612 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) 
In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
In re Chorna, 656 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App’x 950 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
Coffelt v. NVIDIA Corp., 680 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
EasyWeb Innovations, LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 689 F. App’x 969 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
Evolutionary Intelligence LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F. 
App’x 679 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) 
In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, 655 F. App’x 848 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc., 680 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
TDE Petroleum Data Sols., Inc., v. AKM Enter., Inc., 657 F. App’x 
991 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
Tranxition, Inc. v. Lenovo Inc., 664 F. App’x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
635 F. App’x 914 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
W. View Research, LLC v. Audi AG, 685 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
 
Rule 36 Affirmances 
In re Alsabah, 677 F. App’x 684 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Appistry, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 676 F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
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Appistry, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 676 F. App’x 1008 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
Athenahealth, Inc. v. CareCloud Corp., 678 F. App’x 1025 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 639 F. App’x 652 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., 669 F. App’x 575 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telcom, Inc., 669 F. App’x 555 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
CallWave Commc’ns LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 672 F. App’x 995 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Capital Dynamics v. Cambridge Assocs., LLC, 668 F. App’x 889 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 640 F. App’x 
986 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Clear with Computs. LLC v. Altec Indus. Inc., 636 F. App’x 1015 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Cloud Satchel, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 626 F. App’x 1010 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) 
CMG Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pac. Tr. Bank, 616 F. App’x 420 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) 
Concaten, Inc. v. AmeriTrak Fleet Sols., LLC, 669 F. App’x 571 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Datatreasury Corp. v. Fid. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., 669 F. App’x 572 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 599 F. App’x 956 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) 
E. Coast Sheet Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Autodesk, Inc., 645 F. 
App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Essociate, Inc. v. Clickbooth.com, LLC, 641 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Exergen Corp. v. Sanomedics Int’l Holdings, Inc., 653 F. App’x 760 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Gametek LLC v. Zynga Inc., 597 F. App’x 644 (Fed. Cir. 2015)  
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GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., 685 F. App’x 992 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) 
GT Nexus, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc., 669 F. App’x 562 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
HealthTrio LLC v. Aetna, Inc., 673 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Integrated Claims Sys., LLC v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 
684 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 643 F. App’x 
1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
IPLearn-Focus, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 667 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Jericho Sys. Corp. v. Axiomatics Inc., 642 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Joao Bock Transaction Sys., LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc., 
803 F.3d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Kickstarter, Inc. v. Fan Funded, LLC, 654 F. App’x 481 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Kombea Corp. v. Noguar L.C., 656 F. App’x 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc., 639 F. App’x 637 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
Linkgine, Inc. v. VigLink, Inc., 689 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Macropoint, LLC v. Fourkites, Inc., 671 F. App’x 780 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) 
Morales v. Square, Inc., 621 F. App’x 660 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Morsa v. Facebook, Inc., 622 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Netflix, Inc. v. Rovi Corp., 670 F. App’x 704 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Network Apparel Grp., LP v. Airwave Networks Inc., 680 F. App’x 
1003 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Nextpoint, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 680 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
NexusCard, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 688 F. App’x 916 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Novo Transforma Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 669 F. 
App’x 555 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Open Parking, LLC v. ParkMe, Inc., 683 F. App’x 932 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
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Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. v. Xilinx, Inc., 684 F. App’x 971 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
Parus Holdings Inc. v. Sallie Mae Bank, 677 F. App’x 682 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) 
Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC. v. Amazon.com Inc., 671 F. 
App’x 777 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
Pres. Wellness Techs. LLC v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols. Inc., 684 
F. App’x 970 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Priceplay.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 627 F. App’x 925 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) 
RaceTech, LLC v. Ky. Downs, LLC, 676 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
Ret. Capital Access Mgmt. Co. v. U.S. Bancorp, 611 F. App’x 1007 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) 
SkillSurvey, Inc. v. Checkster LLC, 683 F. App’x 930 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) 
Voxathon LLC v. FCA US LLC, 671 F. App’x 793 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
In re Webb, 609 F. App’x 643 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
White Knuckle Gaming, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 683 F. App’x 931 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Williamson v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 683 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
Wireless Media Innovations, LLC v. Maher Terminals, LLC, 636 
F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
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APPENDIX B 
Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges 
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APPENDIX C 
Votes Cast in Federal Circuit § 101 Cases by Judges Who Were 
Not Active Federal Circuit Judges as of June 19, 2017 
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APPENDIX D 
Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges Plus Judges 
Bryson and Mayer  
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APPENDIX E 
Regression Analysis Including All Active Judges Except Judge 
Newman and Chief Judge Prost 
 
